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I. INTRODUCTION: TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB AND THE
LACK OF AN ADEQUATE REMEDY

A recent lawsuit filed against government contractors operating at Abu
Ghraib prison depicts egregious abuse against detainees at the hands of U.S.
officials and civilian contractors.' One plaintiff, referred to in the litigation
only as Saleh, had been imprisoned and tortured in Abu Ghraib prison under
the Saddam Hussein regime.2 After his release from prison, he fled to Sweden
where he became a citizen.3 Following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003,
Saleh returned to Iraq, responding to the call for expatriates to assist in the
rebuilding effort.4 As he attempted to enter the country with funds to invest
in the rebuilding effort, U.S. officials detained him--they tied him up, placed
a hood on his head and placed him in the back of a truck.5 Within a few days,
Saleh was sent to Abu Ghraib prison, where he was subjected to outrageous
emotional, sexual and physical abuse.6
Saleh's story is one of many accounts of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in the
lawsuit. Of course, the stories in the lawsuit are supported by the shocking
photographs of uniformed American soldiers posing with nude Iraqi prisoners
at Abu Ghraib 7 and the reports of multiple investigations of the abuse.8 The
law suit, the photos and the Reports detail "numerous instances of 'sadistic,
blatant, and wanton criminal abuses' at Abu Ghraib." 9
The Bush administration responded by blaming the conduct on a "few bad
apples": rogue soldiers acting well outside the scope of their orders to guard

' Third Amended Complaint, Saleh v. Titan Corp., No. 1:05CV 1165 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 12,
2005), availableat http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september-l Ith/docs/CACl3rdLamended
_complaint.pdf.
2 Id. 2.
3Id.
4 Id.

s Id. 113.
6 Id. 115.
7 James Risen, GI. 'sAre Accused ofAbusing Iraqi Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004,
at A15,availableat 2004 WLNR 14923155 (quoting a transcript of 60 Minutes II).
8 See THE ABU GHRAiB INVESTIGATIONS: THE OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INDEPENDENT
PANEL AND THE PENTAGON ON THE SHOCKING PRISONER ABUSE IN IRAQ (Steven Strasser ed.,

2004) [hereinafter Aau GHRAiB INVESTIGATIONS].
9 SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABu GHRAB 22
(2004) (quoting Report of Major General Antonio M. Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the
800th Military Police Brigade, http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse-report.pdf

[hereinafter HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND].
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prisoners."0 However, the reports describe a climate in which the soldiers who
committed the abuse-those pictured posing with Iraqi detainees-were
encouraged to do so.1 U.S. intelligence officers in charge of the prison had
ordered the guards to "set the conditions for interrogations."' 2 The abuse was
not the conduct of a few twisted individuals, the reports indicate, nor of the
civilian contractors alone, but part of a larger plan by U.S. military and
intelligence officials. 3
By most accounts, gross violations of human rights had occurred. By some
accounts, the guards and interrogators had committed torture. 4 Under
international law, violations of human rights obligate the offending party "to
terminate the violation and, ordinarily, to make reparation, including in
appropriate circumstances restitution or compensation for loss or injury."' 5
The United States responded to the allegations of abuse by commissioning
further investigations and prosecuting the soldiers in court-martial
proceedings. 6 The initial court-martials against the six "bad apples," all of
whom were very low in the chain of command, left many wondering whether
higher-ranking officials should bear responsibility and accountability for the
abuse.' 7
Although some U.S. soldiers were held accountable, to date, the United
States has not met obligations to compensate the victims of abuse. In his

"0See Johanna McGeary, PointingFingers:The Top Brass Says the Scandal atAbu Ghraib
Can Be Blamed on a Few Bad Apples, but Didthe Pentagon'sZealous Pursuitof Intelligence
Give a License for Abuse?, TIME, May 24, 2004, at 44.
" See ABU GHRAIB INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 8.
12 HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND, supra note 9.
'3 See ABU GHRAIB INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 8; see also McGeary,supra note 10; HERSH,
CHAIN OF COMMAND, supra note 9.
14

Seymour M. Hersh, TortureatAbu Ghraib,NEWYORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42, available

at 2004 WLNR 9613890.
" RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OFFOREIGN RELATIONS § 901 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT];
see also Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts arts. 30,31,
U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter Draft
Articles on State Responsibility].
16 See ABU GHRAiB INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 8. See also Kate Zernike, The Reach of
War: The Verdict; U.S. SoldierFound Guilty in IraqPrisonAbuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2005, at Al, availableat 2005 WLNR 567563.
17 Eric Schmitt, The Reach of War: Atrocities 4 Top Officers Cleared by Army in Prison
Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2005, at Al, available at 2005 WLNR 6340858; Kate Zemike,
The Conflict in Iraq: Abu Ghraib Scandal; High-Ranking Officers May Face Prosecution in
IraqiPrisonerAbuse,Military Officials Say,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,2005, at A8, availableat2005
WLNR 620824.
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testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld promised to "seek[ ] a way to provide appropriate
compensation to those detainees who suffered grievous and brutal abuse and
cruelty at the hands of a few members of the U.S. military.' 18 Not apparent in
Secretary Rumsfeld's promise is the fact that a number of international norms
obligate the United States to make good on that promise. 9
This Note focuses on the U.S. obligation under Article 14 of the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT),2" which requires states to implement
mechanisms in their legal systems to ensure redress and an "enforceable right
to fair and adequate compensation."'" The United States claims to have met its
obligations under the CAT, notwithstanding a reservation that purports to limit
the scope of Article 14's obligation to acts of torture committed "in territory
within its jurisdiction."2 2 Currently, where an act of torture occurs on U.S.
soil, a victim has a right of action in U.S. courts.23 Even for acts of torture
committed on foreign soil at the hands of a foreign official, the victim may
have a right of action in U.S. courts against the foreign official, regardless of
the victim's nationality.24 However, where a U.S. official commits an act of
"STestimony of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld before the Senate and House
Armed Services Committees 4 (May 7, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/
sp20040507-secdefl042.html. Referring to compensation of victims, Mr. Rumsfeld stated: "It
is the right thing to do. I'm told we have the ability to do so. And so we will-one way or
another." Id.
19 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESOSOC], Hum. Rts. Comm., Draft,Basic Principles
and Guidelineson the Right to a Remedy and Reparationfor Victims of[Gross] Violations of
InternationalHuman Rights Law and[Serious]Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw,
8-11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/57 (Nov. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Basic Principles].
20 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT].
21

Id. art. 14.

22

U.S. RESERVATIONS, DECLARATIONS, AND UNDERSTANDINGS, Convention Against Torture

and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, CONG. REc. S 17486-01 (daily
ed. Oct. 27, 1990), availableathttp://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/tortres.html [hereinafter
U.S. RUDs].
23 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1997); 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2000); see also 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1996); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
"24 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005) (providing a right of action for an alien to sue for a tort in
violation of a treaty of the United States or customary international law). See, e.g., Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d. 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
See also Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
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torture on foreign soil, U.S. law does not provide an adequate mechanism by
which a victim may seek reparations from the U.S. government or its
officials. 25 Thus, a significant gap remains under existing U.S. law. A foreign
citizen who is the victim of abuse at the hands of U.S. government officials on
foreign soil does not have an adequate remedy.26
Because Article 14 of the CAT obligates states to provide compensation to
victims of torture at the hands of its officials, this Note argues that the United
States should reform its domestic law to provide a civil right of action against
U.S. officials analogous to the Torture Victim Protection Act,27 in spite of the
relevant reservation to Article 14. First, this Note argues that the reservation
is a misinterpretation of the CAT and that the concerns underlying the
reservation do not apply to a situation where a U.S. official has committed the
act. Next, this Note shows that the domestic mechanisms currently in place in
the United States to satisfy its obligation under Article 14 claim do not provide
an adequate remedy. Finally, this Note suggests reforms that U.S. lawmakers
should make in order to insure that the United States meets its treaty
obligations.
Following this Introduction, Part II describes the CAT, focusing
specifically on the scope of Article 14. Part II.B discusses the U.S. response
to human rights treaties generally and to the CAT specifically. Part 11I.A
analyzes the U.S. reservation to Article 14. Part II.B analyzes current
available domestic remedies for torture victims, concluding that they fail to
provide for fair and adequate compensation in accordance with Article 14.
The analysis concludes that, in spite of the reservation to Article 14 and in
light of the policy implications of failing to provide a right of action, the
United States should reform its current domestic law in order to provide a civil
right of action to a victim of torture committed by a U.S. official on foreign
soil.
Although this analysis is roughly fifteen years removed from the United
States adoption of the CAT, its implications have been brought into sharp
focus by the events at Abu Ghraib-acts of torture committed by U.S. officials

(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
25 See infra Part III.B.
26 As will be discussed in Part III.B, a victim may have a right of action against an
individual. However, this Note will argue that such a right of action, as it currently exists, is
inadequate to meet the obligations of the CAT.
27 Torture Victim Protection Act, 106 Stat. 73.
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on foreign soil.28 Thus, although much of this analysis occurs in the
hypothetical, the Abu Ghraib situation acts as a lens for this analysis.2 9
II. BACKGROUND: THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND THE
U.S. RESPONSE
30

A. The PurposeandScope of the Convention Against Torture andArticle 14

The CAT fits into a larger body of international and regional human rights
instruments forged during the latter half of the twentieth century to protect "an
array of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights."'" The CAT is
"[t]he most important U.N. treaty for controlling, regulating, and prohibiting
torture and related practices. ' '32 The United Nations (U.N.) Commission on
Human Rights began the work of drafting a text for a Convention Against

28 This analysis may apply to acts alleged by detainees at Guantanamo Bay as well.

However, Guantanamo is more likely to be considered territory within the jurisdiction of the
United States, thus the extraterritoriality analysis would not apply. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004); Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted,124
S. Ct. 534 (2003).
29 In using the Abu Ghraib situation as its lens, the analysis does not detail the events that
occurred there. This matter has been sufficiently treated elsewhere. See HERSH, CHAIN OF
COMMAND, supra note 9. Further, using Abu Ghraib as a lens requires the analysis to make a
few assumptions. First, it assumes that an act of torture has occurred that meets the definition
in the CAT. Second, it assumes that the act has occurred on foreign soil. Realistically, these
issues would likely be disputed in a proper treatment of the Abu Ghraib prison scenario. Finally,
it does not take into account the law of war or the status of the detainees as prisoners of war.
30 Because this analysis engages in the task of treaty interpretation, it acknowledges the
framework established by Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. The Vienna Convention
requires interpretation by looking first to the ordinary meaning of the terms, then to the object
and purpose of the treaty, then to other contemporaneous instruments, then to the subsequent
practices of the parties. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 22, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331. If necessary, the interpreter may look to the negotiating history of the treaty, the
travauxpreparatoire.Id. art. 32.
31 Office of the U.N. High Commission for Hum. Rts. [OHCHR], 1 Human Rights, A
Collection of InternationalInstruments, foreword by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, xiii, U.N.
Doc. ST/HR/Il/Rev. 6 (2002), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/
docs/partl .pdf [hereinafter UnitedNations, Human Rights].
32 Winston P. Nagan & Lucie Atkins, The InternationalLaw of Torture: From Universal
Proscriptionto Effective Application andEnforcement, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 97 (2001).
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Torture in 1977."3 The Commission finalized the draft in 1984. The U.N.
General Assembly adopted it, and it was entered into force in 1988." 4
Article 14 of the CAT requires states to provide a right of action to victims
of torture to ensure "fair and adequate compensation."35 Although not the
most prominent measure of the CAT, Article 14 provides an important
enforcement and prevention tool in the fight against torture. Part 1 of Article
14 states:
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of
an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to
fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full
rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim
as a result of an act of torture, his dependents shall be entitled to
compensation."
The drafters of the CAT specifically intended (1) to offer clarity and
structure in order to strengthen existing norms prohibiting torture,37 (2) to
provide state specific obligations,38 and (3) to establish mechanisms for the
prevention of torture. 39 Article 14 serves these purposes. It seeks to clarify
and support existing norms regarding compensation of victims of torture,
focuses its obligations on states as the entity most likely to engage in torture,
and it seeks to prevent torture in addition to merely providing a sanction as
punishment.4" Further, Article 14 provides a remedy to individual victims
rather than
to the victim state-a feature of many modem human rights
treaties. 4'1

33 J. HERMAN BURGERS

& HANS

DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST

TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN
OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 31 (1988).
34 Id. at 1.
31 CAT, supra note 20, art. 14(1).
36

Id.

37 BURGERS & DANELIUS, supranote 33, at 1.
38

Id.

3' Nagan & Atkins, supra note 32, at 90.
40 See infra Parts IA.1-3.
41 See infra Part II.A.4.
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1. Offering Clarity andStructure to Existing Norms

The drafters of the CAT recognized that "torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment" was "already outlawed under
international law."4' The preamble of the CAT affirms this notion, explicitly
recalling the other instruments outlawing torture.43 Thus, the CAT's principal
aim is not to outlaw torture-as a number of the human rights instruments
drafted in the wake of World War II and years following include provisions
prohibiting torture. 4 Rather, the CAT aims "to strengthen the existing
prohibition of such practices by a number of supportive measures. 45
To support these earlier restrictions, the CAT puts in place a number of
substantive measures obligating state parties to implement standards within
their domestic law, including a definition of torture, a requirement to
criminalize torture, and mechanisms providing for education, investigation and
compensation.4 6 "For the first time, it was established under treaty law which
specific obligations for the development of the ban on torture ...

42 BURGERS & DANELIUS,

enjoyed

supranote 33, at 1.

43 CAT, supranote 20, pmbl. The preamble notes Article 55 of the Charter of the United

Nations, Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(adopted by the General Assembly on December 9, 1975). Id.
44 BURGERS & DANELIUS, supranote 33, at 1. Although "abolition of torture in criminal law
swept virtually all of Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries," in the early
twentieth century, a number of totalitarian regimes used torture as the means by which they
retained their power, giving rise to the need for further proscription. Id.at 10 (quoting EDWARD
PETERS, TORTURE 4-5 (1985)). Thus, the 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
specifically included torture in Article 5: "No one shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). Further,
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) includes a clause
virtually identical to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration. Further, the ICCPR makes the
prohibition of torture non-derogable. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). A
number of regional human rights instruments also contain prohibitions of torture, including the
European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, the
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, and the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human
Rights. See UnitedNations, Human Rights, supra note 31, ch. 3.
41 BURGERS & DANELiUS, supra note 33, at 1.
4 CAT, supranote 20, arts. 1,4, 10, 12, 14.
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'
Thus, the CAT created clarity and structure to
universal agreement." 47
undergird the existing norms prohibiting torture.
Just as with the rest of the CAT, the right to redress found in Article 14 was
an established principle of human rights law at the time of drafting. A number
of international human rights instruments in existence at the time of the
drafting of the CAT provide for "the right of every individual to an 'effective
remedy' by competent national tribunals for acts violating human rights."4' 8
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, provides
that "[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
constitution or by law."' 49 The International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) "ensure[s] that any person whose rights or freedoms.., are
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."5
Additionally, norms in international humanitarian law instruments provide
a right to a remedy. The Hague Conventions "provide[ ] for the obligation of
the contracting party to pay indemnity in case of violation of the regulations.""l
The Geneva Conventions provide that "[n]o High Contracting Party shall be
allowed to absolve itself to any other High Contracting Party of any liability
incurred by itself or another High Contracting Party" with respect to "grave
breaches involving such acts as 'wilful (sic) killing, torture or inhuman
treatment."52 They further provide that a prisoner of war may make a claim for
compensation if his rights under the convention are violated. 3
Although these instruments clearly include obligations to compensate
victims, they leave "flexibility in the mechanisms by which [victims] receive

47 CHRIS INGELSE, THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTuRE: AN ASSEssMENT 83 (2001).

48 U.N. Comm. on Hum. Rts., Study Concerningthe Right to Restitution,Compensationand

Rehabilitationfor Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms,
26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (July 2, 1993) (preparedby Theo van Boven) [hereinafter
van Boven Report]. Theo van Boven was also co-author of the Basic Principlescited supra in
note 19.
49 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 44, art. 8.
" International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 43, art. 2(3)(a) (emphasis
added).
51van Boven Report, supranote 48, 35 (referring to The Hague Convention Regarding the
Laws and Customs of Land Warfare).
52 Id. 36 (quoting Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts.
130, 131).
" Id. 37 (quoting Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art.
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it.' ' 54

Because the earlier instruments do not make the scope and content of the
right to redress entirely clear, Article 14 aims to clarify the existing norms by
providing specificity in its obligation."
2. Influencing State Behavior andResponsibility
A second aim of the CAT was to influence the behavior of its state parties
and to hold them accountable for preventing acts of torture.16 Generally,
torture is most likely to occur where there is an imbalance of power-an
opportunity to abuse authority.5 7 The CAT recognizes, therefore, that public
officials and others acting in an official capacity are most likely to commit
torture.58 Thus, it seeks to influence government officials by focusing its
obligations on its state parties.
Article l's definition of torture demonstrates the focus on state
responsibility. It defines torture narrowly, focusing solely on "pain and
suffering ... administered at the instigation, consent, or acquiescence of a
public official or another person acting in an official capacity."59 A focus on
official conduct assumes that "the normal machinery ofjustice will operate"
if private persons commit torture, "and punishment will follow under the
normal conditions of the domestic legal system., 6' However, government
officials committing torture may avoid the domestic legal system if they are
responsible for the "machinery of investigation and prosecution.",6' Thus, the
CAT requires states to implement measures criminalizing acts of torture
committed by officials and those in authority.
" Katherine Shirey, The Duty to Compensate Victims of Torture Under Customary
InternationalLaw, 14 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 30, 36 (2004).
" The scope and content of Article 14 may also be gleaned from other sources. The Special
Rapporteur on Torture, a position created by the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights,
affirms and fleshes out the requirements in Article 14 in his general recommendations on torture.
The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Report of the SpecialRapporteur,
on the Question of Torture, U.N. OHCHR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/62 (2004).
Further, the United Nations has set out to develop a set of basic principles focused specifically
on compensation of victims of human rights violations. See Basic Principles,supra note 19.
56 BURGERS & DANELius, supra note 33,
at 1.
57Nagan & Atkins, supra note 32, at 91.
58 BURGERS & DANELIUs, supra note 33, at 1.
5 Nagan & Atkins, supra note 32, at 93 (citing CAT, art. 1). Article 1 applies to conduct
"inflicted by or at the instigation of... a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity."
60 BURGERS & DANELUS, supra note 33, at 120.
61 Id.
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Article 2 also demonstrates the CAT's focus on states. It reads: "Each state
Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures
to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction. 6 2 This
provision "highlights the importance of state compliance in the effective
application of the [CAT]. ' ' 63
Article 14 follows suit, placing its obligations squarely on the state, like the
other substantive provisions of the CAT. Thus, each state must make remedies
available "in its legal system."' This requirement indicates that compensation
must not be made on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. Rather, in line with the
principles of Article 2, the state party must have in place a concrete mechanism
by which to provide compensation. "[C]ompensation can be granted as an ex
gratiameasure in appropriate cases," that is, on a case-by-case basis without
recognizing that any liability or legal obligation is insufficient. 65 The state
must have a structure
in place which ensures "redress" and "fair and adequate
66
compensation.
Article 14 does not specify from whom the victim may seek redress. It
merely requires that state parties provide "redress" and "fair and adequate
compensation" in their legal systems.67 The term "redress" refers to "an
official recognition of the wrong that has been done to the person concerned"
in the form of an apology. 68 "Compensation" on the other hand refers to
payment of an amount of money.69 While "redress" clearly contemplates the
state acknowledging responsibility, it is unclear from the terms of the treaty
whether the state must be the source of the compensation. Article 14 does not
prohibit the state from establishing the right to seek compensation from the
perpetrator of the crime individually-and may encourage it. But whether the
state is obligated to do more than provide the right is unclear from the

62 CAT, supra note 20, art. 2. Although this Article appears to limit its scope to territories
under its jurisdiction, other parts of the instrument extend the scope beyond the borders of the
state parties. Id. art. 5(b) (requiring jurisdiction over offenses "when the alleged offender is a
national of that State").
63 Nagan & Atkins, supra note 32, at 99.
64 CAT, supra note 20, art. 14(1).
65 BURGERS & DANELIus, supra note 33, at 146. A member of the Committee Against
Torture has suggested "that [compensation and redress] must be an automatic response and
that... 'it should not be necessary to go to court in order to obtain them.'" INGELSE, supranote
47, at 371.
66 CAT, supra note 20, art. 14(1).
67 id.

68 BURGERS & DANEL1us, supra note 33, at 146.
69

Id.
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language of Article 14. Relying on the law of state responsibility, the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Reparations has indicated that states are responsible for
making reparations for violations of human rights "attributable to the State. 70
Further, according to the 'UN's Basic Principles, the state's responsibility to
make reparations includes both compensation and redress. 7
This
understanding supports the interpretation that the state must actually pay the
required compensation to the victim.72 However, it may also suffice for the
state to provide a mechanism whereby a victim has a right of action against an
individual torturer.73 In that case, the state must ensure that the mechanism
provides for fair and adequate compensation, and if the perpetrator is not able
to pay, the state must assume liability. 74 Further, it follows that the higher up
the chain of command a "defendant" in such an action is, the closer to the
CAT's aim of state responsibility.
3. Prevention
A third aim of the CAT is the obligation to prevent torture. Because the
effects of torture cannot be undone once suffered, "emphasiz[ing] the
prevention of torture" is of the utmost importance in the scheme of the CAT.75
Thus, Article 2 establishes an obligation "not only to prohibit but to prevent
acts of torture."7 6 Further, the obligation in Article 2 is to take effective
measures to prevent torture. Thus, the measures taken must not merely
prohibit torture, nor merely enact toothless prevention measures, for "a formal
prohibition is not sufficient, but the acts shall actually be prevented."77
The CAT contains provisions that place obligations on states to take both
expost and ex ante action against an act of torture, each of which serves the

70 van Boven Report, supra note 48, 9 40.

" Basic Principles, supra note 19, IT 8-11. "Compensation shall be provided for any
economically assessable damage resulting from human rights violations." Id. 9. What Burgers
and Danelius refer to as "redress," the Basic Principles refer to as "satisfaction and guarantees
of non-repetition." Id. 11. The content of the obligation is the same.
72 INGELSE, supra note 47, at 371-73 (discussing the Committee Against Torture's
interpretation of the CAT in regards to whether states or individual perpetrators should be held
liable for compensating victims).
" Id. at 372.
74 Id.
" Nagan & Atkins, supra note 32, at 99.
76 BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 33, at 123.
77 Id.
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aim of preventing torture.78 Some ex post measures serve to stigmatize
torturous conduct or to create criminal or civil liability for an act of torture.7 9
Other ex post measures require states to investigate once an act of torture
occurs, to prevent reoccurrence."0 Each of the provisions, however, attempts
to meet the end goal of prevention-to ensure that fewer acts of torture ever
occur.
The obligations in Article 14, to provide for redress and compensation,
correlate to the obligation in Article 2 to put measures in place to prevent
torture. First, the concept of redress includes preventing repetition of the
abusive conduct. The U.N. has established that one of the forms of reparation
required of a state is to make "guarantees of non-repetition and prevention."'"
The content of the term "redress" in the text of Article 14 does not explicitly
require such guarantees, yet the Basic Principles indicate that part of making
2
the victim whole is to provide such measures in a state's legal system.1
Requiring states responsible for torture to provide compensation to victims,
in addition to satisfying victims' damages, provides an incentive to the
offending state to prevent torture from occurring again," Ifsuch an obligation
is consistent internationally, other states that are aware of potential financial
liability for committing torture have an incentive to refrain. It may be argued
that the threat of financial liability does little to affect state behavior,
especially a state willing to commit torture. However, Article 14 does not
provide the CAT's sole torture prevention mechanism. Thus, although a
requirement to compensate may not provide enough incentive on its own to
prevent a state from committing torture, it fits within the entire scheme of the
CAT, which aims to prevent torture by states.

78 For example, Article 10, an ex ante measure, requires states to provide "education and
information regarding the prohibition against torture" in the training of public officials and
others "who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual
subjected to... arrest, detention or imprisonment." CAT, supranote 20, art. 10. On the other
hand, Article 5's criminal framework and Article 14's civil framework provide expost measures.
79 Id. arts. 4-6, 14.
80 Id. art. 12.
8IBasic Principles,supra note 19, 25.
82 Id.

83 Further, in requiring states responsible for torture to compensate victims, the obligations

of Article 14 may be analogized to tort law. One of the goals of tort law is "to punish
wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 c (1979).
See generally TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION (Craig Scott ed., 2001).
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4. Focus on Victims
Although primarily concerned with establishing state responsibility for acts
of torture, Article 14 also focuses on individual victims of torture.84 This focus
stems from the principles established in earlier human rights instruments.
Traditionally, the law of state responsibility focused not on remedies available
to individuals, but on remedies available to states." A victim of a human
rights violation would have to rely on her home state to make a claim. 6
However, many of the human rights instruments promulgated in the latter half
of the twentieth century gave individuals the right to recover, thus shifting the
focus of state responsibility in international human rights law.87
Article 14 of the CAT follows suit, requiring redress to an individual, rather
than to the nation of the individual. Further, Article 14, by referring to "an act
of torture," indicates that the application of the Article is not necessarily
limited to systematic torture rising to the level of a crime against humanity.88
Thus, even if only one individual is subject to torture, the obligation under
Article 14 is implicated. Further, the provision creates a right to "fair...
adequate compensation." This phrase indicates that compensation must not be
merely symbolic. 9 "[I]t must be required that compensation be paid for any
costs which the victim may have had for medical or psychological
treatment.... [T]he non-material damage which [the victim] suffered as a
consequence of the torture must also be compensated in a significant way."9

84 This focus on the victim, distinguishes Article 14, along with Articles 13 and 15, from the

rest of the CAT's focus on states and the perpetrators of torture. Article 13 provides the right
of complaint to victims, which begins the investigation process. CAT, supra note 20, art. 13.
Article 15 provides protection from the consequences of statements made under torture. CAT,
supra note 20, art. 15.
85 See RESTATEMENT § 711 cmt. a.
86 Id.

87 See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

art. I,at 59,21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (Mar.
23, 1976). See also International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
88 In contrast, the Rome Statute, creating the International Criminal Court and providing
redress for torture victims or other victims of human rights violations, made civil liability
dependent upon a finding of systematic torture rising to the level of a crime against humanity.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M. 999, art. 7(l)(f) (1998), reprinted
in HENRY J. STEINER & PHIL

ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,

PoLrrics, MORALS 1193 (2d ed. 2000).
89 BURGERS & DANELiuS, supra note 33, at 147.
90Id.
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Thus, Article 14 establishes clear obligations that states must put in place in
favor of victims.
B. The U.S. Response to the CAT: RUDs
The United States "played a leading role in developing and drafting the
[CAT]," culminating in its adoption by the General Assembly in 1984. 9, The
United States signed the CAT in 1988 and the Reagan administration
submitted it to the Senate for its advice and consent, which was granted in
1990.92

However, "[t]he executive branch apparently decided that the

Convention should not be ratified until Congress enacted implementing
criminal legislation required by the Convention. Congress finally enacted such
legislation in April 1994 and the United States ratified the [CAT] in October
1994."93 The Senate, at the suggestion of the executive branch, conditioned its
advice and consent upon a package of reservations, understandings and
declarations (RUDs). 94
The United States has made it a standard practice to attach a significant list
of RUDs to its ratification of human rights treaties. 95 The practice of attaching
RUDs to human rights treaties began as an effort to appease opponents of
ratification, as "a way to commit . . . to human rights treaties in the

international arena while accommodating domestic concerns."96 Generally,

91

Harold Hongju Koh and James E. Castello, Briefing on the InitialReport of the United

States ofAmerica to the UN CommitteeAgainst Torture,Oct. 15, 1999, availableat http://www.
Koh stated that the
state.gov/www/policy-remarks/1 999/991015_ko__xpttorture.html.
convention was signed in 1992. However, the Senate gave its advice and consent in that year.
The United States signed the treaty in 1988.
92 S.REP. No. 101-30 (1990).
13 Louis Henkin, Comment, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
SenatorBricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341,348 (1995) [hereinafter Henkin, U.S. Ratficiation]. The
treaty was not ratified upon the Senate's advice and consent, but required implementation
legislation, because the Reagan administration declared that the treaty was not self-executing.
For a discussion of the non-self-executing doctrine, see generally Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONsTrrIUTIoN (2d ed. 1996).
" U.S. RUDs, supra note 22. "No government had previously asserted such an extensive
list of reservations, declarations, and understandings as that proposed by the U.S .....Nagan
and Atkins, supra note 32, at 98.
" Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399,423 (2000). In addition to the CAT, the United States attached
similar packages of RUDs to the ICCPR and the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. See Henkin, U.S. Ratification,supra note 93.
96 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 95, at 400-01. Professors Bradley and Goldsmith place
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RUDs "are designed to harmonize the treaties with existing requirements of
U.S. law and to leave domestic implementation of the treaties to Congress."9 7
They address the concerns and objections of those opposed to ratification of
human rights treaties. 98 Each of the RUDs in the typical package of U.S.
reservations, in turn, seeks to address these domestic concerns and
objections.9 9
Likewise, the RUDs to the CAT reflect a number of domestic concerns.
President Reagan submitted the CAT to the Senate with seventeen proposed
conditions. 0 The Bush administration trimmed the number to ten by the time
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered it in 1990,10 the same
number with which Senate granted its advice and consent that year.'0 2 The
RUDs include "reservations" limiting the U.S. obligation under Article 16 and
opposing the "ICJ clause" of the treaty;'0 3 "understandings" regarding U.S.

domestic concerns about human rights treaties into three categories: substance, scope, and
structure. Id. at 401.
97 Id. at 416.
98 Domestic concerns include the following concerns: that treaty obligations would "conflict
with either constitutionally guaranteed rights (like the First Amendment) or well settled and
democratically popular practices (such as capital punishment for heinous crimes)"; that "vague
and open-ended" treaty language would "generate... uncertainty regarding the application and
validity of... domestic laws"; that treaties would undermine principles of federalism--both with
respect to bicameralism and to the division of federal-state power; and that treaty obligations
would undercut the sovereignty of the United States, either by subjecting it to the jurisdiction
of an international tribunal or by imposing obligations not "democratically" created. Id. at 400;
see also Henkin, U.S. Ratification,supra note 93, at 341 (describing a number of "principles"
that guide the practice of attaching RUDs).
" Thus, just as domestic concerns may be categorized, so may U.S. RUDs: those that
"decline to commit the United States to certain substantive provisions in the treaties"; those that
"declare that the treaties are not self-executing and thus not enforceable in U.S. courts until
implemented by congressional legislation"; and those that "express an understanding that some
provisions of the treaties may be implemented by state and local governments rather than by the
federal government." Bradley & Goldmsith, supra note 95, at 401.
'00 S. REP. No. 10 1-30, at 7 (1990).
10 Id. at 7-10.

U.S. RUDs, supra note 22.
"03Id. 1(2). Article 30(2) of the CAT established that a state may "declare that it does not
consider itself bound by" Article 30(1), which provides that disputes may be referred to the
International Court of Justice. CAT, supra note 20, art. 30(1).
102
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interpretation of Articles 1,10 4 3,105 and 14,106 in addition to "understandings"
regarding the death penalty'0 7 and a federal-state limitation;... and
10 9
"declarations" that the substantive part of the CAT is "not self-executing"
and "recogniz[ing] the competence of the Committee Against Torture" with
certain limitations." 0 Finally, the RUDs include a "proviso," not to be
attached to ratification, that required the President to notify "ratifying
parties... that nothing in this Convention requires or authorizes legislation,
or other action, by the [United States] prohibited by [its] Constitution ... as
interpreted by the [United States]."'" The U.S. reservation to Article 14
limiting the scope of the obligation to acts of torture committed "in territory
under the jurisdiction" of the United States is the focus of this analysis." 2
"04 U.S. RUDs, supranote 22, II(1)(a)-(e). The understandings regarding Article 1 attempt,
among other things, to limit the CAT's definition of torture to acts that have the specific
intention of "inflict[ing] severe physical or mental pain or suffering." Id. 11(l)(a). This
understanding has been particularly controversial.
105Id. 11(2). The understanding regarding Article 3 relates to non-refoulement policy,
adopting what it claims is a "more stringent" standard. S. REP. No. 101-30, at 10. This choice
has been the subject of much debate.
106 U.S. RUDs, supra note 22, 11(3). This understanding is the subject of analysis infra.
107 Id. 11(4) (asserting a U.S. understanding that the CAT obligations do not require the
United States to prohibit the death penalty). This provision is similar to a reservation in the
ICCPR.
1o' Id. 11(5) (limiting the U.S. implementation "to the extent that it exercises legislative and
judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered by the Convention...").
109 Id. III(1). In its initial report to the Committee Against Torture, the United States made
the following assertions regarding the non-self-executing treaty doctrine:
[P]rovisions of a treaty... denominated "nonselfexecuting"... may not be
invoked or relied upon as a cause of action by private parties in litigation.
Only those treaties denominated as "selfexecuting" may be directly applied
or enforced by the judiciary when asserted by private parties in the absence
of implementing legislation. This distinction derives from the U.S. Supreme
Court's interpretation of article VI, ci. 2, of the Constitution. The distinction
is one of domestic law only; in either case, the treaty remains binding on the
United States as a matter of international law.
Initial Report of the United States to the U.N. Committee Against Torture, U.N. CAT, Initial
Reports of States Parties Due in 1995, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Oct. 15, 1999) [hereinafter
Initial Report].
110 U.S. RUDs, supra note 22, 111(2).
...Id. IV. This proviso was received as a communication to the U.N. Secretary General on
June 3, 1994. Because a treaty is part of the "supreme law of the land," just as with any other
statute, a treaty obligation may not, as a matter of U.S. law, conflict with the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. VII; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957); see also RESTATEMENT § 111 cmt.
a. Thus, the proviso is merely a statement of this principle.
12 U.S. RUDs, supra note 22,
11(3). This analysis uses "reservation" interchangeably with
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II. ANALYSIS: THE U.S. "UNDERSTANDING" AND ITS APPLICATION IN
U.S. COURTS

An analysis of the U.S. reservation to Article 14 and of the domestic law
relied upon to implement U.S. obligations under that provision reveals that the
domestic concerns which generated the reservation do not reach the scenario
at issue here, where a U.S. official commits an act of torture on foreign soil.
The reservation's underlying concern was, primarily, the possibility of
universal civil jurisdiction-where a foreign official commits an act of torture
against a foreign victim--not with jurisdiction over all conduct committed on
foreign soil. " The reservation fails to make a distinction that the CAT makes
elsewhere-between jurisdiction over non-territorial acts oftorture committed
by aliens (universal jurisdiction) and non-territorial acts committed by
nationals (nationality jurisdiction or active personality jurisdiction). The
application of jurisdiction based on nationality is not the focus of the U.S.
reservation; thus, a failure to provide a right of action to a victim of torture
committed by an American official is unwarranted by the concerns compelling
the reservation.
A. Analysis of the U.S. "Understanding"ofArticle 14 and its Jurisdictional
Scope
The U.S "understanding" of Article 14 reads as follows: "Article 14
requires a State Party to provide a private right of action for damages only for
acts of torture committed in territory under the jurisdiction of that State
Party." "4 The U.S. reservation acknowledges some of the basic requirements
of Article 14, such as the requirement to provide a civil right of action to
victims of torture. Thus, it acknowledges that Article 14 requires the United
States to have a mechanism in its domestic legal system that gives victims the
right to sue for damages.5

"understanding" because, as a matter of treaty law, an "understanding" is in effect the same as
a reservation and must be treated as such. See ANTHONY AuST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND
PRACTICE 100-05 (2000).
"t

S. REP. No. 101-30 (1990).

U.S. RUDs, supra note 22, 11(3). This reservation was one of a number of reservations.
"No government had previously asserted such an extensive list of reservations, declarations, and
understandings as that proposed by the U.S. State Department's letter of December 19, 1989."
Nagan & Atkins, supra note 32, at 98.
"' Whether "damages only" meets Article 14's definition of "fair and adequate
14
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As with the other U.S. RUDs, the United States made reservations to
Article 14 in order to meet specific domestic concerns and objections to the
ratification of the treaty. The U.S. Senate's Summary and Analysis of the
CAT (Summary and Analysis), prepared by the State Department prior to
submission to the Senate for advice and consent, implies that one of the
domestic concerns underlying the reservation was a concern that Article 14
may create a" 'universal' right to sue."' 6 Were Article 14 to apply universal
civil jurisdiction, just as Article 5 applied universal criminal jurisdiction, it
would require states to provide a right of action where a foreign official had
committed an act of torture against a foreign victim on foreign soil.
Particularly, the concern of the administration was that, without the
reservation, Article 14 would "open U.S. courts to cases having no nexus
whatsoever to the United States, essentially providing the civil analogue to
'
'universal jurisdiction' in the international criminal field."117
Although U.S.
courts had recognized such a right of action under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS), 11 8 the U.S. government sought to avoid creating a treaty obligation,
enshrining a right of action for foreign citizens against foreign citizens." 9 In
short, the Reagan and Bush administrations opposed the use of the ATS to
allow human rights claims in U.S. courts, as the Second Circuit had allowed
12 ° As long as such a claim
in Filartigav. Pena-Irala.
was a part of U.S.
domestic law and not an obligation under the treaty, Congress could amend the

compensation" is debatable, but is not the subject of this analysis. See BasicPrinciples,supra
note 19. Further, the United States has acknowledged that "[a] question could be raised whether
Article 14 is intended to require a victim compensation scheme or whether it is sufficient that
victims have a right to bring a civil suit against the alleged torturer." S. REP. No. 10 1-30, at 24.
It concludes that "[e]ither approach would seem to provide 'an enforceable right to fair and
adequate compensation.' " Id. While this conclusion may be correct, the debate is not within
the scope of this analysis.
116 S.
REP. No. 101-30, at 24. The Summary and Analysis also reflects a concern that Article
14 would affect "the immunities from civil jurisdiction and liability that States and certain
individuals enjoy." Id.
117 David P. Stewart, The Torture Convention and the Reception of InternationalCriminal
Law Within the UnitedStates, 15 NOvA L. REV. 449,460 (1991) (stating Stewart was an official
with the State Department during the Bush administration and a proponent of the reservations).
118 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (providing a right of action for an alien to sue for a tort in violation of
a treaty of the U.S. or of customary international law). See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. 692; Filartiga,
630 F.2d 876. See also supraPart II.A. The statute is interchangeably referred to as the Alien
Tort Claims Act and the Alien Tort Statute. Because it was a statute in the Judiciary Act of
1789, Alien Tort Statute is a more appropriate moniker.
"9 S. REP.NO. 101-30, at 10.
120 Filartiga,630 F.2d 876.
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domestic legislation. The executive branch did not believe that Article 14
compelled the extension of a right for conduct on foreign territory, as
contained in the ATS.' 21 Thus, the reservation limited the application of
Article 14 to territory under U.S. jurisdiction.
In the Summary and Analysis, the United States argued that its
understanding was consistent with the negotiating history of the CAT. 122 It
claimed that "Article 14 was in fact adopted with express reference to 'the
victim of an act of torture committed in any territory under its
jurisdiction.'"123 It offered the explanation that "[t]he quoted wording appears
to have been deleted by mistake., 124 Although the initial Swedish draft of the
Convention did not contain a clause limiting it territorially, 25 Burgers and
Danelius confirm that, in 1981, the Working Group responsible for drafting the
CAT adopted a proposal by the Netherlands "to insert the words 'committed
in any territory under its jurisdiction' after the word 'torture.' '126 However,
neither the travauxpreparatoires,the Burgers and Danelius work, nor the U.S.
analysis offers an adequate explanation for why the language was removed
before the treaty's submission to the General Assembly for approval. 127 The
Reagan administration argued that its "interpretation [of Article 14] is
confirmed by the absence of any discussion of the issue since the creation of
a 'universal' right to sue would have been as controversial as was the creation
of 'universal jurisdiction' [in the criminal provisions] ... ."I28 Had the
deletion been intentional, it follows that the debate would have been recorded,
as it had been for the debate over universal criminal jurisdiction. Therefore,
the United States reasoned, the omission must have been a mistake.' 29 The
121Stewart, supra note 117; see also S. REP. NO. 101-30, at 23-24.
122 S. REP. No. 101-30, at 23-24.
'23
Id. at 24.
124 Initial Report, supranote 109, 268.
25 BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 33, at 68.
126 Id. at 74. Burgers and Danelius each participated in the drafting of the Convention.
Burgers was part of the Netherlands delegation and was elected Chairman-Rapporteur of the
Working Group in 1982. Id. at vi, 77.
127 Andrew Byrnes, Civil Remedies for Torture CommittedA broad:An Obligation under the
Convention against Torture?, in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION, supra note 83, at 537. Byrnes
argues that the U.S. explanation is the most plausible alternative to the possibility that the
deletion was inadvertent. Id.
128 Id at 456.
129However, this reasoning does not take into account that many state parties already
provided for victim compensation schemes in their domestic criminal law. See, e.g., Second

Periodic Report of France to the Committee Against Torture, CAT,

150, U.N. Doc.
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U.S. reasoning is not conclusive and the possibility remains that the omission
of the territorial limitation was intentional. 3 It does not explain how the
treaty was submitted to and adopted by the General Assembly with the
omission going unnoticed.
Article 14 does not specify whether it requires application of its terms to
torture occurring in a territory outside a state's jurisdiction.' 3 ' Several of the
provisions of the CAT give the impression that it intends its obligations to
apply territorially.'32 For example, Article 2, setting forth the guiding principle
for the remaining substantive provisions,133 requires states to commit to
prevent torture "in any territory under its jurisdiction."'' 3 4 This general
principle may indicate that Article 14, because it does not explicitly provide
for extraterritorial jurisdiction, should apply only territorially. However,
Article 2 does not indicate that each of the substantive provisions of the CAT
must apply exclusively territorially.
The criminal provisions in Article 5 require that a state's obligations extend
outside of its jurisdictional territory-for torture committed anywhere,
including on foreign soil. Article 5(2) specifically provides for universal
criminal jurisdiction.' Thus, states must establish criminal jurisdiction over

CAT/C/i 7/Add. 18 (Oct. 8, 1997). Article 3 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure states,
"a civil action may be brought at the same time and before the same court as the prosecution"
and French law requires that reparation for the injury suffered by the victim must be made 'in
full, not just to some extent.'" Id. 150, 155. Thus, for those states with victim compensation
schemes in their domestic criminal law, the universal jurisdiction requirement in Articles 5, 6
and 7 would, in addition to providing for universal criminal jurisdiction, provide for a
"universal" victim compensation scheme. Thus, the deletion of the language "committed in any
territory under its jurisdiction" may not have warranted a debate.
130 The Committee Against Torture, which has some authority under the CAT to provide
interpretation has not spoken specifically on this issue.
"3 Wendy Adams, In Search of a Defence of the TransnationalHuman Rights Paradigm:
May Jus Cogens Norms Be Invoked to CreateImplied Exceptions in Domestic State Immunity
Statutes, in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION, supra note 83, at 247, 262.

Byrnes, supra note 127, at 542.
supraPart IIA.2.
134 CAT, supra note 20, art. 2. Many of the other provisions have territorial application.
For
example, the provisions regarding investigation, education, and right to information apply
territorially. CAT, supra note 20, arts. 10, 13. See generally Byrnes, supra note 127, at 542.
135 Ahcene Boulesbaa's work refers to the jurisdiction required in Article 5(2) as "multi-state
jurisdiction." AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE PROSPECTS
FOR ENFORCEMENT 205 (1999). It claims that 5(2) does not require universal jurisdiction
because "jurisdiction in the Torture Convention [is] ... limited to the States Parties of the [CAT]
which is intended to deny torturers safe haven in such States." Id.
132

133 See

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 34:187

alleged torturers, regardless of where the act of torture was committed and
regardless of the nationality of the accused or the victim. A national of state
X, who committed an act of torture in state Y against a national of state Y, is
subject to the criminal jurisdiction of state Z (or any other state). The
universal jurisdiction provisions of the CAT were intended to "make[ ] it 1as
36
difficult as possible for torturers to find a safe-haven in a foreign country.'
In addition to requiring universal jurisdiction, Article 5 requires that states
assert jurisdiction over conduct committed by its nationals (nationality
jurisdiction) even ifthat conduct occurs on foreign territory. 137 Paragraph 1(b)
of Article 5 of the CAT requires criminal jurisdiction "[w]hen the alleged
offender is a national of that State.' 3 8 Under the principle of nationality
jurisdiction, a state may assert jurisdiction over "activities, interests, status, or
relations of its nationals outside . ..its territory."'' 39 Although the most
common basis for the exercise of jurisdiction is territorial, international law
does recognize that nationality provides a sufficient link for a state to exercise
jurisdiction. 4 ° Thus, under Article 5(l)(b), a national of state X, who commits
an act of torture in state Y against a national of state Y, must be subject to the
jurisdiction of state X, his home nation. Article 5 thus distinguishes between
two types of jurisdiction that may be applied to acts occurring outside the
territory of the state party: universal jurisdiction and nationality jurisdiction.
Like the criminal provisions in Article 5, Article 14 is an enforcement
mechanism, intended to place a penalty on an act of torture.' 4 ' Thus, in line
with the CAT's torture prevention aim, it follows that Article 14 applies
extraterritorially, at least where the torturer is a national of the state. However,
whether or not Article 14 extends the universal jurisdiction in the criminal
realm to the civil realm is not at issue in this analysis.'42 Rather, this analysis
focuses on whether Article 14 requires jurisdiction over acts committed by

136 BURGERS &DANELIUS, supra note 33, at 58. The U.S. delegate to the Working Group that
was drafting the CAT expressed that universal jurisdiction "was intended primarily to deal with
situations where torture is a State policy and, therefore, the State in question does not, by
definition, prosecute its officials who conduct torture ....[And] [i]t
could be utilized against
official torturers who travel to other States." Id. at 79.
'7 CAT, supra note 20, art. 5(l)(b).
138

Id.

139RESTATEMENT

§ 402(2).

Id. § 402 cmts. a, c.
141See supra Part II.B.5.
140

For arguments on either side of the question of whether Article 14 requires universal
jurisdiction, see Byrnes, supranote 127. See also Ingelse, supra note 47, at 362.
142
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nationals of a state party-to make it as difficult as possible for torturers to
find safe haven in their home nation.
Given its focus on state responsibility, Article 14 likely envisions a right of
action based on nationality jurisdiction, even if it does not require universal
jurisdiction. Notably, scholars have assumed that Article 14's obligations
extend to conduct for which a state is responsible. For example, arguing that
Article 14 does not require universal jurisdiction, Professor Andrew Byrnes
notes, "[A] person may be tortured abroad, in State X, by agents of State Y.
In such a situation, State Y could not plead the extraterritorial location of the
torture so as to escape its duty to provide redress for acts of torture for which
it bears responsibility.' ' 43 Further, Professor Byrnes states that Article 14
"should ... be understood as limited to requiring remedies only for torture
committed under the jurisdiction of the State party (and for which it is
responsible)."'"
Professor Byrnes does not provide any basis for the
interpretation in the parenthesis, instead stating it as if it is understood to be
true. Nationality jurisdiction under Article 14 for an act of torture, at least to
Byrnes, is obvious.'4 5
The idea that Article 14 envisions a state-provided civil right of action for
conduct committed by its nationals on foreign soil resonates with the notion
of state responsibility. 146 A state is responsible as a matter of international law
to compensate a victim of an act of torture for which it is
responsible-regardless of where that act occurs.' 47 Thus, given the CAT's
focus on holding states responsible and the other international norms regarding
reparations, it stands to reason that Article 14's requirement that a state
provide a right of action when a national of that state commits torture is an
obligation on that state, regardless of where the torture occurs.
Although the U.S. understanding ofArticle 14 does not distinguish between
universal jurisdiction and nationality jurisdiction, the understanding appears
to apply to both, limiting the right of action based on territory, regardless of
who commits the act of torture. The U.S. Summary and Analysis regarding
Article 14 seems most concerned with universal jurisdiction, rather than
nationality jurisdiction, as noted above.'4 8 Thus, the breadth of the U.S.

143

Byrnes, supra note 127, at 540 n.9.

144 Id.
145 Id.
146

See supra Parts II.A.3.

147 See Basic Principles,supra note 19.
148

See supra text accompanying notes 115-20.
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reservation extends beyond its intended concerns." 9 The reservation might
have been limited to an "understanding" that Article 14 does not require a
"universal right to sue" or that it does not require jurisdiction without a
nexus.' 50 However, the U.S. reservation engrafts all conduct committed on
foreign territory.
The concerns of the United States regarding the universality principle do
not apply in the scenario where a U.S. citizen has committed an act of torture.
The concern of universality is that a court would have to hear a claim for
which it has no nexus-a foreign plaintiff, a foreign defendant, a cause of
action stemming from conduct on foreign territory. In the scenario at issue in
this analysis, however, the nationality of the defendant is the same as that of
the forum. Thus, the court would have a sufficient nexus to assert jurisdiction.
The United States should acknowledge Article 14's inherent obligation to
provide a civil right of action for victims to sue based on the nationality of the
torturer. However, the United States has made a reservation to a treaty and, as
such, unless specifically implemented by Congress, a private cause of action
is only available to the extent that it exists under domestic law.' 5 ' The United
States claims that "existing U.S. law already establishes private rights of suit
sufficient to implement Article 14. ' The United States acknowledges the
obligation under Article 14, but does not require it, "some U.S. courts have
held that current U.S. law provides a right of action for acts of torture
occurring outside the United States."' 53 However, existing domestic law does
not provide a right of action to torture victims for an act of torture committed
by an officer of the U.S. government on foreign territory.
B. Analysis of Existing US. Domestic Remedies
Although the United States claimed in its Summary and Analysis that
existing U.S. law at the time was sufficient to meet its obligations under
Article 14, existing domestic mechanisms available to victims of torture
committed by a U.S. official on foreign soil are inadequate. 5 4 Regarding its

149See Henkin, US. Ratification, supra note 93, at 342 (discussing U.S. reservations to the
ICCPR).
150 Id.
.51See supratext accompanying note 108.
152 See S. REP. No. 101-30, at 24.
153 Id.
154 See Scott J. Borrowman, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
and Abu Ghraib, Civil
Remedies for Victims of Extraterritorial Torts by U.S. Military Personnel and Civilian
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obligations under Article 14, the United States has assured the Committee
Against Torture that the mechanisms currently in place provide "ample
possibility for recovery of 'adequate reparation.' "'55 In spite of its
understanding of Article 14, the U.S. report to the Committee notes that "the
rights and remedies [available] ...
may be broader than the U.S. interpretation
5
6
statute."'
"[I]n
some
circumstances,
U.S. law provides a potential
of the
remedy for foreign victims of torture occurring outside the United States."' 5 7
However, the two remedies that apply to acts committed outside the United
States, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)'58 and the Torture Victim's Protection Act
for a victim of an act of torture committed
(TVPA), 159 do not provide a remedy
16
1
soil.
foreign
on
official
by a U.S.

Contractors, 2005 BYU L. REv. 371 (describing potential remedies available to Abu Ghraib
detainees). This Comment also addresses the viability of the Foreign Claims Act (FCA), 10
U.S.C. § 2734 (2005), which provides for the creation ofa claims commission in countries where
the U.S. has a significant military presence. Id. at 376. The Comment concludes, based on
anecdotal evidence, that the FCA has not provided an adequate remedy to injured Iraqis. Id.at
377.
' Initial Report, supranote 109, 270. The Initial Report includes the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2671, in the possible remedies available to
torture victims. That statute "waives [the] sovereign immunity of the United States for certain
torts," which may shed some light on this analysis. Initial Report, supra note 109, 275.
However, the statutory scheme also excludes "any claim arising in a foreign territory." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(k) (2000). A recent decision by the Supreme Court, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, struck
down the use of "headquarters doctrine" which had been used to obviate the foreign territory
exclusion of the FTCA. 542 U.S. 692, 734-35 (2004). The Supreme Court reasoned that, as a
matter of tort law, the law that applies to a particular case is the law of the place where the injury
occurs. Thus, because the intent of the exclusion was to avoid the application of foreign
substantive law in U.S. courts, the "foreign country exception bars all claims based on any injury
suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred." Id.at
741. See Anthony J. Sebok, CouldSuits Against the U.S. Government by Iraqis Subject to Abuse
inAbu GhraibPrisonSucceed?, FINDLAW'SWRIT, May 31,2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
sebok/20040531.html (discussing the possibility of using the FTCA against the U.S.
government).
156 Initial Report, supra note 109,
268.
157Id.
11828 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005).
' Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 106 Stat. 73.
160 Borrowman, supra note 154, at 416 (suggesting that a Bivens claim may be available to
detainees at Abu Ghraib). However, the author does not resolve whether or not a constitutional
claim, such as a Bivens claim, would be available to a non-U.S. citizen. Id. at 415-18.
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1. The Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim ProtectionAct
The ATS provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States."'' By establishing a right of action
based on international law in U.S. federal courts, the framers sought to avoid
conflicts with other nations and to provide some remedy for foreign
diplomats.16 2 Scholars have argued that the framers enacted the ATS to "avoid
embroiling the nation in conflicts with foreign states arising from U.S.
mistreatment of foreign citizens. 163
Filartigav. Pena-Irala'6 was the first case to apply the ATS in the modem
era. Under Filartiga,the ATS has become a mechanism for victims of human
rights violations to bring claims in U.S. courts.'65 The Filartiga Court
confirmed the notion, "consistent[ ] with identifiable expectations in the
1790s,"' 166 that the ATS grants not merely jurisdiction, but also "open[s] the
161 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The ATS was included in the Judiciary Act of 1789 as section 9.
Originally, the statute provided that a district court "shall also have cognizance, concurrent with
the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an
alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of the nations or a treaty of the United States."
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). It was enacted, in large part, because
of the framers' concerns of ensuring that international law could be applied in the U.S.,
particularly, to protect foreign individuals. See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts'
ProtectiveJurisdictionOver Torts Committed in Violation of the Law ofNations, 18 CONN. L.
REv. 467, 491 (1986).
162The Marbois affair offers a case in point. In 1784, Marbois, a French ambassador, was
assaulted in Philadelphia by the Chevalier De Longchamps, a French national. Id. (quoting
Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784)). Although the case was eventually
criminally adjudicated in state court, "Congress was powerless to deal with the matter." Id. at
491-92.
163Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the JudiciaryAct of 1789: A Badge of
Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (arguing that Article III of the U.S. Constitution, particularly the
alienage jurisdiction provision, was the framers' response to this need).
'" Filartigo,630 F.2d 876. The case arose when Dr. Joel Filartiga and his family filed suit
under the ATS against Pena-Irala, the former Inspector General of the Police in Asuncion,
Paraguay. The Filartiga family had reason to believe that Pena had been responsible for the
kidnapping and torture oftheir son, Joelito. When Dolly Filartiga, the sister of Joelito and a U.S.
resident learned that Pena-Irala was living in Brooklyn, New York, she initiated a civil suit under
the ATS against him for the wrongful death by torture of her brother. Id.
165 See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal.
2000).
1' Jordan J. Paust, The History, Nature, andReach of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 249 (2004).
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federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international
law." 67 By way of analogy, Filartigamade clear that torture is the new piracy,
and torturers are the new pirates.' 68 The Filartigadecision may have been the
prime reason for the U.S. reservation to the CAT. The Reagan administration
did not want to enshrine the Filartigainterpretation of the ATS.
Since the Filartigadecision, a number of cases have applied the Filartiga
reasoning to claims of violations of international human rights law.'69 The
Supreme Court recently confirmed, in Sosa v. A lvarez-Machain,that "the door
is still . . . open to [claims under] a narrow class of international norms
today"-particularly grievous breaches of international law corresponding to
the common law offenses of "violation of safe conducts, infringement of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy."' 70 Given Filartiga'sstatement that torture
is the new piracy, the A lvarez-Machaindecision, which held that the plaintiff s
rights had not been violated under the facts of that case, left the door open to
a claim of torture as defined in the CAT.' 7 '
In 1991, the U.S. government supplemented the ATS with the TVPA.'7 2
The act provides in part:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color
of law, of any foreign nation- (1) subjects an individual to
torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that
individual; or (2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing
shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual's
legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in
an action for wrongful death.'73
Building upon the success of human rights claims under the ATS during the
1980s, the TVPA extended the right to sue for torture to U.S. citizens."'
Filartiga,630 F.2d at 887. But see Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798.
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798.
169 See Borrowman, supra note 160.
170 Sosa, 542 U.S. 692, 743, 752.
171 Id.
17 Torture Victim Protection Act, 106 Stat. 73.
I7 Id. § 2(a).
174 Senate Report on the Torture Victim Protection Act, S. REP. No. 102-249
(1991),
reprintedin HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INCONTEXT:
LAW, POLrrCS, MORALS 1071 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Senate Report on the TVPA]. The
Senate Report on the TVPA notes that the legislation "will carry out the intent of the [CAT]...
[which] obligates state parties to adopt measures to ensure that torturers within their territories
167
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However, the TVPA applies only to torturers acting under the "authority...
of any foreign nation."' 7 5 This limitation prevents the invocation of the statute
against domestic officials. Further, sovereignty limits on the TVPA and
similar limits on the ATS effectively bar claims against states and have major
implications on the ability of torture victims to sue state officers.
2. Sovereign Immunity and the ATS/TVPA Right of Action
The Senate Report on the TVPA notes that "the legislation uses the term
'individual' to make crystal clear that foreign states or their entities cannot be
sued... under any circumstances."' 176 Courts read a similar limitation into the
ATS under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSLA). 177 In Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,178 the Supreme Court held that "the
FSIA [provides] the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign [s]tate
in [United States] courts." 179 Thus, a plaintiff cannot bring a claim under the
ATS against a foreign sovereign unless that state has waived its immunity or
fits under some exception.
While the TVPA's requirement that the torture be committed under the
authority of a foreign state in order to be actionable specifically excludes
claims against the U.S. government, a rule similar to the FSIA has been applied
in cases brought against the U.S. government under the ATS. In Jama v. U.S.
I.N.S., the court held that "[a]bsent a specific waiver of [sovereign] immunity
the United States and its agencies are immune from suit and courts lack
jurisdiction over them."'' 80 In dismissing the claims against the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS),"' the court stated that the ATS, "in

are held legally accountable for their acts." Id. at 1070.
' Torture Victim Protection Act, 106 Stat. 73.
176 Senate Report on the TVPA, supra note 174.
177 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)
(2000)). "[T]he FSIA sets forth the general rule that foreign states are immune from the
jurisdiction of both federal and state courts in the United States, subject to certain exceptions."
Siderman de Blake v. Argentine Republic, 965 F.2d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1992).
178Argentina Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
179 Id. at 434.
180 Jama v. U.S. I.N.S., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 364 (D.N.J. 1998) (citing F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510
U.S. 471, 474-75 (1994)).
181 The Immigration and Naturalization Service was subsumed by the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, a bureau of the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered sections of

U.S.C.).

2005]

LETIFNG THE

CAT OUT OF THE BAG

providing jurisdiction and a right of action under the law of nations, does
nothing to displace sovereign immunity."'8 2 Thus, the sovereign immunity
doctrine would bar a foreign victim of an act of torture committed by a U.S.
government official from bringing a claim under the ATS against the U.S.
government or one of its agencies.
Some scholars have argued that because torture is ajus cogens norm, a
violation of the norm is not a sovereign act and, accordingly, does not attract
state immunity.' Thus, with a state's sovereign immunity removed, a court
freely may assert jurisdiction over the state. This reasoning would apply
equally to an act by a foreign state and to an act by the United States.
However, the case of Siderman de Blake v. Argentine Republic'84 dealt
squarely with this argument and, relying on Amerada Hess, held that a
violation of ajus cogens norm does not provide an exception to the FSIA.'85
Similarly, such a violation would not constitute a waiver of U.S. sovereign
immunity. Therefore, the sovereign immunity doctrine would bar a suit
against the U.S. government or its agencies, brought by a foreign victim of an
act of torture by a U.S. official.
3. Sovereign Immunity and Individuals
Sovereign immunity likely bars a claim against a government under the
ATS and TVPA, but it may not bar all claims against individuals who act on
behalf of states.8 6 According to the Senate Report on the TVPA, the TVPA
specifically allows for suits against foreign government officials. 87 It uses a
similar line of reasoning as that rejected by Siderman-thata violation of ajus
cogens norm could not be the act of a sovereign, therefore, entitlement to
sovereign immunity is removed for such an act. 188 The Senate Report of the
TVPA expresses that the Act of State doctrine, 189 a corollary to the sovereign
immunity doctrine, does not ... provide a shield from lawsuit for former
officials. 90 It reasons that because the Act of State doctrine "applies only to

..
2 Jama, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 365.
183Adams, supra note 131.
181Siderman de Blake v. Argentine Republic, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
185 Id. at

718-19.

186 See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d 232.
187

Senate Report on the TVPA, supra note 174, at 1071.

188Id.
189

See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 375 U.S. 398 (1964).

90 Senate Report on the TVPA, supra note 174, at 1071.
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'public' acts, and no state commits torture as a matter of public policy, this
doctrine cannot shield former officials from liability under this legislation."''
Thus, under the TVPA, a victim may sue a state official (at least a former
official) for acts that purportedly were the acts of the state. This reasoning
creates the fiction that the acts are not acts of the sovereign because they are
92
violations ofjus cogens norms. 1
The same logic should be applied to suits against U.S. officials who commit
acts of torture under the ATS. Indeed, some courts have allowed suits to be
brought against U.S. officials under the ATS. For example, in Jama,the court
held that, although the INS was immune from suit, federal employees could be
sued under the ATS in their individual capacities.' 9 3 Further, one court has
held that "[w]hile sovereign immunity acts as an absolute bar to damage claims
against federal governmental entities, the doctrine does not completely shield
federal officers who act beyond the scope of their authority, in derogation of
established constitutional and statutory principles, i.e. so-called 'ultra vires'
conduct."' 94 However, where a government official acts in his official
capacity, courts have held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars a
suit."' Thus, under the ATS as it currently exists, if an official acts in an
official capacity, a right of action may not exist. However, an individual
official who commits an act of torture outside "the scope of authority" or "in
derogation of established constitutional and statutory principles" may be
96
subject to a right of action.
C. Chain of Command: Applying the Logic of the TVPA to U.S. Officials
A suit against a low level official may not provide the level of
accountability envisioned by Article 14.19' However, because it is unlikely that
the U.S. government or one of its agencies could be held accountable under

191 Id.

See also Filartiga,630 F.2d 876 (holding that the Act of State doctrine probably does
not apply to acts of a foreign government official that are wholly unauthorized and expressly
forbidden by the foreign sovereign).
192

See Adams, supra note 131.

"' Jama, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 365. But see Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
'9'
Navy, Marshall& Gordon, P.C. v. U.S. Int'l Dev.-Cooperation Agency, 557 F. Supp. 484,
488-89 (D.D.C. 1983).
195 Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 207.
196 Navy, 557 F. Supp. at 489.
197 See supra text accompanying notes 66-73.
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existing domestic law for committing torture abroad, a right of action against
an individual may be the only remedy available. A state that commits an act
of torture may not rely on claims against "a few bad apples" in order to satisfy
its responsibilities under the CAT. In order to provide the level of
accountability required by the CAT, officers further up the chain of command
must be fair game.
If an officer (a soldier, for example) is ordered to commit an act that
constitutes torture, or commits torture as part of a plan, the victim should have
a right of action against those who gave the orders or condoned the conduct.
It stands to reason that the higher up the chain of command, the closer to the
level of state accountability envisioned by the CAT. Under the ATS, as it now
exists, the further away an official is from the actual commission of the act
(and the higher up the chain of command), the less likely he will be subject to
suit.' 98 However, under the TVPA, the victim has a right of action not only
against the individual torturer, but against higher officials as well. In
describing who may be sued, the Senate Report on the TVPA states:
The legislation is limited to lawsuits against persons who
ordered, abetted, or assisted in the torture..... [A] higher official
need not have personally performed or ordered the abuses in
order to be held liable. Under international law, responsibility
for torture, summary execution, or disappearances extends
beyond the person or persons who actually committed those
acts-anyone with higher authority who authorized, tolerated or
knowingly ignored those acts is liable for them. 99
In passing the TVPA, the Senate expressly intended to "carry out the intent of
the [CAT] ... to ensure that torturers within their territories are held legally
accountable for their acts."200
The United States should apply the logic of the TVPA to its own officials
in order to ensure that "torturers within their territories are held legally
accountable for their acts."2 ' A court may not waive sovereign immunity for
conduct within an officer's official capacity because of separation of powers

198

See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza,770 F.2d at 207.

"' Senate Report on TVPA, supra note 174, at 1071-72.
200 Id. at 1070.
201

Id.
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concerns. 20 2 However, in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, then Circuit Judge
Scalia distinguished foreign sovereign immunity, based on "considerations of
international comity," from domestic sovereign immunity, based on
"separation of powers., '2°3 Thus, if Congress amended the ATS to include
higher officials, as it did under the TVPA, such separation of powers concerns
would be removed. Were the United States to provide a civil right of action
against all those who ordered, abetted, or assisted in the torture, the level of
accountability for U.S. actions would increase dramatically and would fall
more closely within the meaning of Article 14.2O4
IV. CONCLUSION: PROVIDING A RIGHT OF ACTION FOR TORTURE
COMMITTED BY U.S. OFFICIALS ABROAD

The United States should recognize a cause of action for a victim of torture,
where the torture was committed by a U.S. official on foreign territory.
Because the U.S. concern over universal jurisdiction is not implicated in this
scenario and because current domestic law does not provide an adequate
remedy, the United States should recognize the right of victims of torture to
"fair and adequate compensation, ' ' in spite of its reservation to Article 14 of
the CAT.
Recent suits against government contractors working under U.S.
intelligence officers and the court-martials of the "few bad apples" do not
reach the level of accountability envisioned in the CAT. The CAT envisions
accountability on the state level. To date, beyond the investigations and court
martials, the United States has assumed very little accountability for the abuse
at Abu Ghraib.
The United States has long been an advocate of human rights
and an
outspoken opponent of state sponsored torture. In 2003, President George W.
Bush, in commenting on the United Nations International Day in Support of
Victims of Torture, said:

202 Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 207 (citing Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
203 Id. This opinion did not address whether Congress had the authority to waive foreign

sovereign immunity under the TVPA.
204 Alternatively, the United States may achieve an appropriate level of accountability by
waiving the foreign country exception to the FTCA. See Sebok, supra note 155.
205 Second Amended Complaint, Saleh v. Titan, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (S.D. Cal. 2004), No.
04CVI 143, availableat http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/docs/Saleh%20v/2OTitan%2OCorp%
20Second%20Amended%20Complaint.pdf. See also Ibrahim v. Titan (case no. unknown),
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/torture/ibrahimtitan72704cmp.html.
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The United States is committed to the world wide elimination of
torture and we are leading this fight by example. I call on all
governments tojoin with the United States and the community of
law-abiding nations in prohibiting, investigating, and prosecuting
all acts of torture and in undertaking to prevent other cruel and
unusual punishment.2 °6
One of the justifications for invading Iraq was to prevent torture under the
regime of Saddam Hussein. 20 7 "[T]he United States [arguably] remains.., the
greatest protector of individual rights in the world [because] of its . . .
constitutional and democratic processes. 2 8 Thus, as a model for the rest of
the world, the United States has a responsibility to meet the obligations
imposed by the CAT. Since it is a model, U.S. non-compliance "reduces the
gravitational moral pull of human rights law., 2 9 In order to prevent torture on
a global scale, a cause to which it has committed, the United States must
prevent torture by its own officials and hold them accountable for such
conduct. Providing a civil right of action for foreign victims of torture
committed by U.S. officials according to the principles established in the
TVPA would approach the level of accountability imposed by Article 14.

206 President George W. Bush, Statement on the United Nations International Day in Support

of Victims of Torture (June 26, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/
20030626-3.html. On the same day, State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher issued a
similar statement:
We continue to be appalled by the actions of governments that use torture or
turn a blind eye to its occurrence. They may try to escape international
scrutiny and accountability for their actions, but as long as torturers around
the world spread fear and suffering, the United States will not waver in its
commitment to eliminate torture.
Richard Boucher, Press Statement, United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of
Torture, June 26, 2003, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/21976.htm.
207 Briefing with Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Eliminatingthe Threat to
WorldSecurity Posedby the IraqiRegimeandHaltingthe Torture,Imprisonment andExecution
ofInnocents, Foreign Press Center Briefing (Mar. 28,2003), http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/19202.htm.
201 Jack Goldsmith, InternationalHuman Rights Law & the United States Double Standard,
1 GREEN BAG 2D 365, 371 (1998).
209 Id. at 372.

